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ADV AN CED WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
To assess the current state of Co1n1nunist China's nuclear weapons 
and missile program and, insofar as possible, estimate the future course 
and size of that program. 
NOTE 
Although we have obtained a considerable amount of new infor-
mation in the past year or so, there reinain serious gaps in our in-
formation and we are therefore not able to judge the present state 
or to project the future development of the Chinese program with any 
high degree of confidence. The specific judgments in this paper 
should be read in the light of this general caution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Communist China's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 was 
of an implosion fission device with U-235 as the fissionable material 
and a probable yield of 19 kilotons (KT). We cannot estimate with 
confidence its weight or dimensions but believe it was relatively large 
and heavy. The most likely source of the U-235 was uranium first 
brought to partial enrichment in the gaseous diffusion facility at Lan-
chou and then further enriched by the electron1agnetic process. We 
cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the U-235 was of Soviet or 
other non-Chinese origin though we believe this to be highly Ynlikely. 
B. Although we have no good basis for estin1ating the current level 
of production of fissionable material, we believe that the Chinese will 
have enough material during the next two years to conduct a test 
program, with enough left over to stockpile at least a fe\v bo1nbs. The 
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Chinese could now build bo1nbs based on the results of their first 
test which could be carried by their two TU-16 n1ediu1n jet bmnbers 
or their 12 or so TU -4s. 
C. The evidence leads us to esti111ate that the Chinese Con1111unists 
are developing a i11ediun1-range ballistic inissile ( :NIHB~1 ) . We be-
lieve this systen1 is essentially a Soviet design, probably the SS-4, 
perhaps with some Chinese inodifications. It is possible that the 
Chinese could have a few ~1RBMs ready for deployment \Vith con1-
patible fission \varheads in 1967 or 1968. A weapon in bon1b con-
figuration could be available s01newhat earlier and could be delivered 
by the Chinese air force's light jet IL-28 bombers of which they have 
about 290. 
D. The Chinese have a subn1arine closely sin1ilar in outward ap-
pearance to the Soviet G-class sub1narine which is designed to launch 
350 n.m. ballistic inissiles while surf aced. We do not know whether 
the Chinese built this sub1narine or assembled components supplied 
by the USSR, or what inissile they expect to put in it. We have no 
evidence that the Chinese are constructing any inore of this type sub-
1narine and it would be at least several years before any units could 
be operational with Chinese-produced n1issiles. 
E. The Soviets provided the Chinese with son1e surface-to-air n1is-
siles ( SAMs ) by n1id-1960. We have no evidence to confinn or deny 
that the Soviets have furnished any inore since then and we do not kno\v 
how n1any such missiles are now in China. The Chinese have a urgent 
requirement for SAMs and we believe are working hard on a production 
progran1. There are indications that the Chinese are no\v producing 
some kind of surface-to-air inissile, either Soviet-type SA~1s or proto-
types of a Chinese version. The evidence is not sufficient to pennit a 
firm judg1nent but we think it highly unlikely that either will be pro-
duced on a large scale for two or three years. 
F. It is unlikely that the Chinese will develop a deliverable thern10-
nuclear weapon for several years, and there is little chance of an inter-
continental capability until after 1970. 
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